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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Lileth Shelley, Respondent herein, by and through counsel 
Phillip B. Shell, files this brief in opposition to the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari previously filed by the Appellants herein. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellants present three issues for review: First, were Mrs. 
Shelley's complaints of pain medically sufficient to establish the 
sole etiology of her pre-existing condition; second, did the Court 
of Appeals err in modifying Allen v. Industrial Commission by 
making qualitative distinctions between types of pre-existing 
conditions in determining whether to apply the higher standard of 
legal causation; and third, does the Court of Appeals* decision 
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maintain the "clear and workable rule for future application of the 
Commission' as established in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
The Respondents oppose the granting of the Writ on all three 
issues, for the reasons set out hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Respondent submits that there are no specific determinative 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules in 
connection with this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not have any major disagreements with the facts 
as cited by the Appellants in their brief. However, it may be 
helpful to stress what Respondent deems to be important in the 
Court's consideration of the facts: 
1. Respondent Lileth Shelley was 50 years old at the time of 
the 1985 industrial injury in question. At that time she had been 
employed by the Appellant for over 13 years as a warehouse worker 
(R. at 2, 33, 34) . 
2. The 1985 injury occurred while Mrs. Shelly was twisting 
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while on a ladder in lifting a 35 lb. box of shower curtains over 
the protective railing of the ladder (R. at 35, 36). 
3. Mrs. Shelley had sustained two prior low back injuries, 
both occurred while on the job and while employed by the Appellant 
or its predecessor in interest. The first injury occurred in 1975 
while she was lifting a 35 to 40 lb. case of shoes (R. at 62). The 
second low back injury occurred in 1978 when Mrs. Shelley was 
bending over a waist high case containing boxes of tightly packed 
underwear. As she was struggling to remove the boxes from the 
case, she felt her back pop (R. at 54). 
4. The Respondent received medical treatment from Dr. Harold 
P. Hargreaves for each of the two prior injuries. She was also 
treated by Dr. Allred after the 1978 injury and wore a corset for 
about five months following this injury. She testified that after 
these injuries, she had occasional problems with her back (R. at 
55, 306). 
5. Mrs. Shelley's medical history shows no other prior or 
subsequent injuries to her back. The medical records further give 
no indication of any disease or back problem of any kind prior to 
the initial injury in 1975 (R. at 52, 52, 69, 71, 161, 162). 
6. After the 1985 injury, Mrs. Shelley's treating physicians, 
Dr. S. William Allred, and Dr. J. Charles Rich, diagnosed Mrs. 
Shelley as having a pre-existing condition in 1985 of degenerative 
spondylolisthesis, a condition which is often started by trauma to 
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the back. This was attributed to the prior work injuries (R. at 
102, 217, 270, 272). 
7. Mrs. Shelley was rated by Dr. Allred as having a 25% whole 
body impairment with 12 1/2% due to the 1985 injury and 12 1/2% due 
to the pre-existing problem (R. at 102). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AFFIRMING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Writ of Certiorari should not be granted to review the 
determination of the Court of Appeals that the factual findings of 
the Industrial Commission were not arbitrary nor capricious. 
Regardless of how the Appellants phrase the question in their 
petition, there was sufficient evidence before the Industrial 
Commission upon which to base its factual findings. 
The Commission found that Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition 
was the result of prior industrial accidents incurred while 
employed by the same employer. They found no evidence in the record 
that any of Mrs. Shelley's back problems pre-dated or existed 
independent of her industrial injuries. 
The Commission considered the evidence concerning the origin of 
the pre-existing condition in order to determine whether it was due 
to on-the-job injuries or non-industrial causes. 
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There is no evidence in the record to show that Mrs. Shelley 
suffers from any congenital back problem nor that she had any 
problems that pre-dated her first back injury in 1975. 
At the evidentiary hearing, she testified that the first injury 
to her back occurred at work in 1975 (R. at 52). Mrs. Shelley also 
testified that she had not had a problem with her back prior to the 
1975 injury (R. at 69). Her testimony does not reveal any back 
problems other than those ensuing after her three industrial 
injuries. 
The medical records from the Respondent's treating physicians 
further support this. For example, in the records of Dr. Harold 
Hargreaves, M.D., an x-ray summary for a film taken in 1975 states 
"Lumbar spine normal." (R. at 162). His records do not reflect any 
complaints or treatment relating to the back prior to 1975, 
although the Respondent had seen him first in February of 1969 (R. 
at 161). The records of Dr. Kenneth Guymon mention a work injury 
to the back in May of 1978 and the 1975 back injury three years 
before (R. at 171). Although he treated various ills beginning in 
1972, there is nothing in Dr. Guymon1s records to suggest of prior 
back problems. 
In a letter dated June 13, 1985, Dr. J. Charles Rich, M.D., Mrs. 
Shelley's neurologist, stated, "...the only episodes of back pain 
she has ever had (have) been those related not only with work but 
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with this same employer over the course of the last few years." (R. 
at 217). 
Dr. Rich, in an operative report dated 7/23/85, stated, as to 
preoperative and post operative diagnoses, "L5-S1 disk herniation 
and degenerative spondylolisthesis.11 (R. at 270). 
Degenerative spondylolisthesis is the slipping of one 
vertebra over another due to degenerative processes (ie. the result 
of trauma) rather than due to congenital defects. 
Dr. William Allred, M.D., the treating orthopedic surgeon, 
stated in the 7/31/85 discharge summary of a finding of "L5-S1 
central disc defect with a bilateral nerve root compression L4-5 
and mild degenerative Pseudo-spondylolisthesis." (R. at 272). 
Further, Dr. Allred1s 1987 Summary of Medical Record indicates a 
50/50 apportionment between pre-existing conditions and the 1985 
industrial injury. In responding to a question of aggravation he 
stated as follows: 
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-
existing condition? Please explain as necessary. 
Yes. The patient had had two previous episodes of back pain of 
brief duration. 
(R. at 102). 
After the evidentiary hearing at the Industrial Commission, the 
Appellant hired Dr. David Beck to examine Mrs. Shelley for an 
independent medical examination. Dr. Beck, who saw the Respondent 
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only once, stated the opinion that the 1975 and 1978 injuries 
probably have no bearing on Mrs. Shelley's long-term problem. He 
apparently attributed the pre-existing portion of the back problem 
to other origins. However, this is only Dr. Beck's opinion and it 
is not supported by any explanation or evidence of any kind (R. at 
293, 294). 
The Commission, as stated in its final order, found no evidence 
in the record to show that any of Mrs. Shelley's back problems were 
due to congenital defects or anything pre-dating the first 
industrial injury of 1975. Rather, it found ample reasons for the 
factual conclusion that the pre-existing problems in Mrs. Shelley's 
back are due to the prior work injuries (R. at 334). 
The findings of the Commission are supported by substantial 
evidence, are not arbitrary nor capricious, and were properly 
affirmed. The Court of Appeals by its affirmation did not depart 
from its accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, nor did 
it sanction such a departure by the Industrial Commission as to 
call into exercise the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
POINT II 
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE DECISION 
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH 
THE HOLDING IN ALLEN v. IND. COMM. 
The Appellants continue to urge that the principles adopted by 
the Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra, do not support 
the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals and the Industrial 
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Commission in this matter. However, Appellant's analysis is flawed 
and is incorrect. 
In Allen this Court adopted a test which requires, in the 
context of legal causation, that a claimant with a pre-existing 
condition show that the injury resulted from extra exertion. A 
worker without a pre-existing condition does not have to meet the 
higher standard. The stated reason for the extra exertion 
requirement was to determine whether "the employee brings to the 
workplace a personal element of risk such as a pre-existing 
condition." Allen at 25. The Court stated that the adoption of a 
higher standard of legal causation in such a case would serve to 
"offset the pre-existing condition of the employee as a likely 
cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairment 
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertion at work." Allen 
at 25. (Emphasis added). 
If the medical evidence shows that an injured worker's problems 
are directly related to the work injury in question, legal 
causation should not be defeated on the pretext of a pre-existing 
injury where it is established that such pre-existing injury was 
created in the same workplace in which the accident in question 
occurred. A worker does not bring any personal element of risk to 
the workplace where any so-called pre-existing conditions are the 
result of prior work injuries stemming from that same employment 
with the same employer. 
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Hence, where a worker brings no pre-existing injury to the 
workplace, but has a compensable injury (or injuries) on the job, 
and subsequently while on the job sustains an otherwise compensable 
injury to the same area of the body, he should not have to meet the 
higher legal standard to establish compensability, if the injury 
was incurred while working for the same employer. This is because 
the worker's increased risk of injury with respect to the later 
claim is attributable strictly to the hazards previously 
encountered at that same employment. 
In such a situation, the purposes for invoking the higher legal 
causation standard do not apply. There is no reason to shelter the 
employer from liability for the last injury. The language and 
reasoning of Allen do not mandate a different conclusion, but in 
fact support it. 
Appellants would argue that to allow the Court of Appeals' 
decision to stand would undermine one of the principal purposes of 
Allen; that Allen established a "clear and workable rule for future 
application by the Commission." Ld. at 18. However, even if what 
Appellants claim were true, the Court of Appeals made the right 
determination. 
The focus still remains upon whether a worker brings a personal 
risk to the workplace. It is true that employees with identical 
medical conditions may be treated in a greatly disparate manner 
depending upon the source, or sources, of their disabilities. 
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However, short of a totally socialized system where all disabled 
workers receive compensation, regardless of the cause of the 
disability, the purposes of the workers compensation system mandate 
that if the injury was caused by the workplace, compensation should 
be awarded. Physical conditions which pre-date the job are 
appropriately not the responsibility of the employer and its 
insurance carrier. The decision of the Court of Appeals does not 
change this and should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The record fully supports the action taken by the Industrial 
Commission. The Commission did not act arbitrarily or abuse its 
discretion in finding Mrs. Shelleyfs pre-existing condition to be 
job related. The Court of Appeals acted properly in affirming the 
action of the Commission. 
The Court of Appeals was justified under the philosophy of the 
Allen decision to find that the higher legal standard of causation 
does not come into play when the worker brings no personal risk to 
the workplace, but suffers from a pre-existing job-related injury 
at the time of the final injury. This is sound policy. 
This Court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th da^ > of January. 1991. 
Pftillip B. ^ hell 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Respondent Shelley 
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